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Part I
The concept of nationalism of ideology and shared values has existed since 
Biblical times,1 and has only become more prominent in societal structure in the centuries 
which have followed . Many attempts to define what is and is not nationalism have been 
made throughout history,2 yet despite these attempts there is no perfect formula for what 
gives rise to nationalism or what makes a nation-state and how to create it. However, at 
its core a nation is made of people, and all nations, regardless of organization, ideology, 
or ethnicity, turn to law to control – if not shape – their societies. This duality of basic 
composition is perhaps best illustrated by the Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of 
“nation”3 and “state.”4 According to these definitions, a “nation” is “[a] large group of 
people having a common origin, language, and tradition and usually constituting a 
political entity,”5 while a “state” is “[t]he political system of a body of people who are 
politically organized; the system of rules by which jurisdiction and authority are 
exercised over such a body of people.”6 From this emerges the unity of people and law
1
 Throughout the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, there are repeated references to tribal groups which 
functioned as sources of government, laws, kinship, religion, and culture, such as the Canaanites and the 
Hittites. 
2
 There are myriad publications addressing the topic of nationalism and the nation-state. For a cross-section 
of this scholarship, see generally ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY (Reno, NV: University of 
Nevada Press 1991); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (London: Verso 1991); ERNEST 
GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983).
3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (7th ed.).
4 Id. at 1415 (7th ed..).
5 Id. at 1045
6 Id. at 1415.
2which forms the fundamental core of the global concept of a nation-state,, regardless of 
where one believes the concept itself originated.
With the advent of the United Nations (U. N.) in the aftermath of World War II, 
nations and nationalism became framed in the concept of “self-determination.”7 This 
concept - originally meant to refer only to allowing areas under colonial control to 
determine whether they would remain under colonial control or forge their own states8 -
has taken on a life of its own and has been used in the international law realm to support 
the idea of breaking up states and providing support - especially from the United Nations
-  for splinter groups wishing to form their own states, regardless of whether these groups 
were part of the colonial apparatus that the United Nations’ charter was intended to 
eradicate.9
The U. N. Charter also charges the members of the Security Council with 
maintaining international “peace and security.”10 From its initial conception as a means to 
stop interstate conflicts,11 the “peace and security” preservation strand of the U. N. 
Charter has been used in conjunction with the military portions of the Charter to justify 
the creation and deployment of United Nations peacekeepers to areas of intrastate and 
7 See Joe Sills, The United Nations and the Formation of Global Norms in THE UNITED NATIONS: 
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY 35 – 36 (Jean E. Krasno ed.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2004).
8 See Sills, supra note 7, at 35 – 36; U.N. CHARTER chap. XI.
9
 Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter specifies as follows: “Members of the United Nations which have or 
assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories 
are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of 
international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of 
these territories.” U.N. CHARTER chap. XI. 
10 U.N. CHARTER chap. I, art. 1; see also Sills, supra note 7, at 51 – 53.
11 See Sills, supra note 7, at 51 – 53; Jean E. Krasno, The End of the Scourge of War: The Story of UN 
Peacekeeping in THE UNITED NATIONS: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY 225 - 232 
(Jean E. Krasno, ed.) (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO. 2004).
3intra-society conflict as well.12 From keepers of peace and protectors of innocent 
populations, U. N. peacekeeping missions have come to encompass multi-faceted 
operations which attempt not only to protect human innocents, but also to create a legal 
and governmental structure for the affected areas.13 Many of the legal systems which the 
U. N. attempts to impose in the areas where peacekeepers are deployed involve creating a 
constitution which, at least in name, guarantees that all peoples in an affected area are 
represented in various governmental and political bodies.14
This article will address the issue of whether U. N. peacekeeping missions and 
their attendant attempts to restructure the laws and governments of the affected areas 
actually promote the creation of a healthy and viable nation-state. By examining three 
United Nations missions – the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),15 the 
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNMONUC) in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,16and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)17
– this article will examine several cases to see whether these peacekeeping missions do in 
fact lead to viable nation-states. The areas to be examined are the physical stability of the 
area and the ability of the peacekeepers and missions to prevent and respond to 
violence18; the stated goals and activities of the peacekeepers and the missions for the 
affected areas;19 and the constitutional and/or governing documents which the missions 
12 See OVERVIEW: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (detailing 
the rise in peacekeeping deployments and operational scope).
13 See infra Parts II, III, IV, V.
14 See infra Parts II, III, IV.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Parts II, III, IV.
19 See infra Parts II, III, IV.
4have either promulgated or are in the process of attempting to promulgate for the affected 
areas.20
Part II of this article addresses Lebanon and UNIFIL.21 Part II opens with a brief 
discussion of the previous role of the U. N. in Lebanon,22 as well as a short background 
review of both the past and current state of Lebanese politics, law, and society.23
Discussion then moves to the UNIFIL mission itself, which was started in1978 as an 
“interim” mission, yet continues to exist through the present day and indeed has been 
extended through 2006.24 Finally, Part II concludes with analysis of the overall impact 
which UNIFIL has had on Lebanese law and society.25
Part III addresses the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNMONUC. 26 As 
the Congo was also the site of an earlier U. N. peacekeeping mission (indeed, this was in 
many ways the first official site of a peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the U.N. 
peacekeeping force as it is currently envisioned 27), Part III will open with a short history 
of the previous U. N. peacekeeping presence in the Congo.28 Discussion will then turn to 
the history of the current conflict in the Congo.29 This in turn leads to a discussion of 
UNMONUC.30 Part III will conclude with analysis of the impact of UNMONUC on the 
stability of the Congo, as well as on the state of  law and society in the Congo.31
20 See infra Parts II, III, IV.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part II. A.
23 See infra Part II. B. 
24 See infra Part II. C.
25 See infra Part II. D.
26 See infra Part III. A.
27 See infra Part III. A.
28 See infra Part III. A.
29 See infra Part III. B.
30 See infra Part III. C.
31 See infra Part III. D.
5Part IV addresses Kosovo and UNMIK  – and, by extension, Serbia and 
Montenegro.32 A brief history of the Kosovo conflict opens Part IV, accompanied by  a 
discussion of the current state of law, government and society in Serbia and 
Montenegro.33 An examination of UNMIK follows, with close attention paid to both the 
escalation in violent incidents in Kosovo over recent months while UNMIK has been 
present in Kosovo,34 and to the draft constitution which UNMIK is attempting to have 
Kosovars adopt (over the objections of such U. N. Security Council members as the 
United States35).36 The conclusion of Part IV is a two-pronged analysis of the impact of 
UNMIK on Kosovar law and society,37 as well as a comparison of the freedoms and 
rights offered to Kosovars under both the UNMIK draft constitution and the current 
constitution of Serbia and Montenegro.38
In conclusion, Part V ties together observations and analysis from the prior parts 
and draws conclusions as to the role which U. N. peacekeeper missions play in the 
creation of viable nation-states for the future.39 The ultimate conclusion of this article is 
that, whatever the intentions behind peacekeeping missions might be, the structure and 
assigned functions of the U. N. peacekeeping missions discussed at best do not assist in 
the building of a cohesive legal or societal structure in the affected areas to which they 
are deployed,40 and at worst actually serve to cripple the creation of a viable nation-state 
by insinuating themselves, their goals and norms into the new legal structures of the 
32 See infra Part IV. A.
33 See infra Part IV. A.
34 See infra Part IV. B.
35 See infra Part IV. B.
36 See infra Part IV. B. 
37 See infra Part IV. C.
38 See infra Part IV. C.
39 See infra Part V.
40 See infra Part V.
6affected areas.41 In so doing, these missions do not create legal systems which reflect 
shared societal values and norms, but rather insert an international bureaucratic 
understanding of what a nation-state “should” think and do.42 This, it is argued, is the 
exact opposite of the U. N. Charter’s requirement of self-determination and subsumes the 
will of the local population to the will of the U. N. bureaucracy.43 As a corollary, the 
undermining of the nation-state concept which forms the backbone of the U. N. also 
undermines the U. N. Charter’s charge to the Security Council that it promote 
international “peace and security.”44
Part II – Lebanon and UNIFIL
A. Missions past – UNOGIL
Although the UNIFIL mission has been in existence in Lebanon for 27years,45 it 
was not the first experience U.N. peacekeepers had with Lebanon. The first U.N. 
peacekeepers arrived in Lebanon in 195846 for an operation termed UNOGIL (U.N. 
Observation Group in Lebanon).47 The presence of U.N. peacekeepers under the auspices 
of UNOGIL was at the request of the Lebanese government.48 At the time, Lebanon 
domestically was involved in a power struggle between several internal political 
factions49 (with primary divisions made across religious lines, which is the norm in 
41 See infra Part V.
42 See infra Part V.
43 See infra Part V.
44 See infra Part V.
45 See FREDERICK H. FLEITZ, JR., PEACEKEEPING FIASCOES OF THE 1990S: CAUSES, SOLUTIONS, AND U.S. 
INTERESTS 10 (Praeger: Westport, CT. 2002) (describing the many activities of UNIFIL as well as the 
timing of its opening in 1978).
46 FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 12, 200 (stating that UNOGIL’s mandate was to be an “[o]bserver force 
deployed along the Lebanon-Syria border to monitor for illegal infiltration of arms or insurgents into 
Lebanon from Syria).
47
 Krasno, supra note 11, at 240.
48 Id.
49 See id.; BACKGROUND NOTE: LEBANON, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE 
7Lebanon, as Lebanese law,50 politics,51 and society52 are divided along confessional 
lines), and requested the U.N.’s intervention because of the increasing role which Syria 
was playing in giving support to some of the various factions involved in the conflict .53
Although UNOGIL was created to monitor the Syrian role in the Lebanese conflict,54
subsequent events in the greater Middle East led to a tenuous position for the Lebanese 
and UNOGIL,55 which was not allowed to use force in its mandate.56 Ultimately, the 
Lebanese government turned to the militaries of the United States and the United 
Kingdom to provide protection to Lebanese people and allow UNOGIL to continue with 
its observations.57
The UNOGIL mission did not extend past 1958, with the mission ending in 
December, 1958.58 Despite UNOGIL’s presence, and purported ability to monitor the in-
flow of ammunition and other resources to Lebanon, Syrian presence and control in 
Lebanon would not end with the UNOGIL mission.59 Indeed, despite the intervention of 
UNOGIL, Lebanon enjoyed only a brief period of stability in the aftermath of the 
LEBANON]; LEBANON FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter LEBANON FACTBOOK]. 
50 See LA CONSTITUTION LIBANAISE, REPUBLIQUE LIBANAISE ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, available at
http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/constitution.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005); 
51 See generally LOI ELECTORAL PARLIMENTAIRE (2005) (containing confessional-based Parliamentary 
seat distribution and voting mechanisms).
52 See generally Bachir Bilani, Ibrahim Najjar, Antoine El-Gemayel, Personal Status in THE LEBANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I (Antoine El-Gemayel ed. 1985) (describing the various religious courts existing in 
Lebanon and their respective jurisdictions).
53 See Krasno, supra note 11 at 240.
54 See FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 200; Krasno, supra note 11, at 240.
55
 Krasno, supra note 11, at 240 (describing the impact of political instability in Iraq and Jordan on 
UNOGIL).
56 See id.
57 Id.; BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 49; BACKGROUND, LEBANON – UNOGIL, UNITED 
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unogilbackgr.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
BACKGROUND UNOGIL].
58
 Krasno, supra note 11, at 240; BACKGROUND UNOGIL, supra note 57.
59 See infra Parts II. B, C. 
8mission’s termination before being plunged into a vicious and long-term civil war,60 as 
discussed below. It should also be noted that this mission did not interfere in domestic 
Lebanese politics or life, but rather was aimed at controlling the Syrian dimension of 
Lebanese foreign relations; thus, UNOGIL was closer to the idea of stopping interstate 
conflict which was the original premise behind the promotion of “international peace and 
security” in the U.N. Charter used to justify the creation and existence of U.N. 
peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions.
B. Background
As mentioned above, Lebanon is a country which is legally, politically, and 
societally fragmented across confessional lines; this has been the historical trend in 
modern Lebanon. The primary Christian groups in Lebanon are the Maronites,61 and the 
Greek Orthodox,62 with other groups such as other Uniate Churches,63 Roman 
Catholics,64 and Protestants65 also comprising Christian communities in Lebanon. At the 
time of Lebanon’s independence, the majority Muslim group were the Sunnis,66 however 
with immigration to Lebanon from other surrounding countries, and in the aftermath of 
the Lebanese civil war, it is estimated that Shi’is are or will be the majority sect in the 
near future.67
60 BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 49; see generally TOUFIC K. GASPARD, A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF LEBANON 1948 – 2002: THE LIMITS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 97 (2004) (discussing the trends of 
violence and stability in Lebanon during this period).
61
 This sect, allied with the Roman Catholic Church, was founded on Mount Lebanon, and calls the 
Mountain its spiritual home. See OPUS LIBANI, available at
http://www.opuslibani.org/lb/Lebanon/dos003.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
62 See generally EYAL ZISSER, LEBANON: THE CHALLENGE OF INDEPENDENCE 7 – 8, 61 (2000).
63 See LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 49. 
64 See id.
65 See id. 
66 See Rania Maktabi, The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese, 26 BRIT. J. MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDS. 219 (1999).
67 See generally BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 49; LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 49.
9Although the Lebanese constitution decries confessionalism,68 especially in the 
political realm,69 and guarantees the same rights and freedoms to Lebanese of all 
beliefs,70 the country is still governed by sectarian cleavages. Under the terms of the 
National Pact, an unwritten agreement entered into by the ruling confessional groups in 
1958,71 the position of President of the Lebanese Republic will be held by a Maronite,72
the position of Lebanese Prime Minister will be held by a Sunni,73 and the position of 
President of the Lebanese Parliament will be held by a Shi’ia.74 Voters in Lebanese 
elections are registered by religious affiliation,75 and seats in the Lebanese Parliament are 
apportioned among confessional parties.76 In more personal terms, laws relating to 
personal status (typically laws having to do with marriage, divorce, family law, and 
inheritance77) are promulgated and administered by each sect according to its own 
councils and religious courts.78
As the result of many factors which are outside the scope of this article, civil war 
erupted in Lebanon along confessional lines in 1975 and continued until the 1990 Ta’if 
Accords.79 This war, which saw intra-confessional fighting,80 as well as inter-
68 See LEB. CONST. PREAMBLE  (2005).  
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See ZISSER, supra note 62, at 60 – 67. 
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. 
75 LOI ELECTORAL PARLIMENTAIRE, ch. 2 arts. 4, 13 (2005) 
76 See id., appx.
77 See generally Bilani et al., supra note 52.
78 See id.; see also JUDICIARY: LEBANON, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, PROGRAMME ON 
GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION (POGAR), available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/judiciary.asp?cid=9 (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
79
 For a brief discussion of the Lebanese civil war, see Alexandra R. Harrington, Resurrection from Babel: 
The cultural, political, and legal status of Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria and their prospects 
for the future, TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2006). 
80 See id. 
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confessional strife,81 not only engulfed Lebanon, but also attracted such actors as Syria, 
Israel, and the U.N., especially when the conflict started to create instability in the 
Lebanon-Israel border region where many Palestinian refugee camps were located.82
C. UNIFIL - mandate and reality
UNIFIL was given life on March 19, 1978 through U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 425 and 426.83 These resolutions were passed as the result of Israeli
incursions into Lebanon during the civil war,84 and, in pertinent part, authorized U.N. 
action to stop the Israeli incursions85; this action was placed under the direction of the 
Secretary General.86
The first UNIFIL members arrived in the weeks immediately following the 
promulgation and adoption of Resolutions 425 and 426,87 while diplomats were still 
trying to figure out the acceptability of UNIFIL in the area.88 At this time, concerns were 
raised as to what UNIFIL would actually do for and to Lebanon and its territorial
integrity.89 Into the mix of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,90 the Lebanon-Israeli conflict,91
81 See id.
82 See id.; see also WALID KHALIDI, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 130 – 31 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
83 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425 (1978); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 426 (1978).
84 See id.
85 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425 (“The Security Council . . . Decides, in the light of the 
request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations 
interim force of Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring 
international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its 
effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States.”).
86 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 426 (1978) (adopting the Secretary General’s prepared report 
on Lebanon as the governing document for the mission established). See also KHALIDI, supra note 82, at 
131 – 32 (describing the contents of the Secretary General’s report and what it would mean for the area).
87 KHALIDI, supra note 82, at 134.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 134 – 35 (describing particularly Maronite concerns that the presence of UNIFIL would only 
serve to undermine the idea of sovereignty in the already civil war-torn Lebanon).
90 See id. at 134.
91 See id.; CHARLES WINSLOW, LEBANON: WAR AND POLITICS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY 221 (Routledge: 
New York 1996); Kranso, supra note 11, at 240 – 241 (describing the PLO and Israeli factions operating in 
the UNIFIL area and the ways in which UNIFIL access to certain areas was denied by both groups).
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the Lebanese civil war,92 and the complex triangular relationship between Syria, 
Lebanon, and Israel,93 the U.N. was placing peacekeepers at the mercy of the PLO, Israeli 
forces, and other groups operating in the area, with very little recourse for themselves or 
the population living in the UNIFIL area.94
From 1978 to the present, UNIFIL has been a constant presence on the Lebanon-
Israel border,95 yet has been unable to impact the Lebanese-Israeli land dispute beyond 
monitoring and reporting incidents to higher-ups in each government and the U.N. 
structure,96 and providing some forms of humanitarian aide to those living near the 
UNIFIL camp (which, while certainly admirable from a humanitarian point of view, is 
legally in violation of Resolutions 425 and 426, as these only authorize the interim force 
to be present for Israeli withdrawal from the area97).98 Lebanon and Israel have gone back 
and forth over control of  the border in the UNIFIL area, and the progress made in 
removing the Israelis from the contested area was attributable more to other events in the 
region than to the presence and action of UNIFIL.99
92 See KHALIDI, supra note 82, at 134 – 135; WINSLOW, supra note 91, at 221 – 224.
93 WINSLOW, supra note 91, at 221 – 224.
94
 Indeed, the constant efforts of then-Secretary General Waldheim to ensure the safety of UNIFIL and at 
least some promises to honor a ceasefire – in the event that it could be brokered – are well documented. 
See, e.g., KHALIDI, supra note 82, at 133 – 137. More troubling for the prestige of the U.N. and UNIFIL in 
the area was the fact that ultimately the PLO and Maronite groups were brought together by the Lebanese 
Prime Minister in order to agree to use UNIFIL as a means of paving the way towards Lebanese territorial 
integrity. Id. at 140.
95 See UNIFIL BACKGROUND, LEBANON – UNIFIL – BACKGROUND, UNIFIL: UNITED NATIONS INTERIM 
FORCE IN LEBANON, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter UNIFIL BACKGROUND].
96 See id. (“UNIFIL monitored the area through ground and air patrols and a network of observation posts. 
It acted to correct violations by raising them with the side concerned, and used its best efforts, through 
continuous, close liaison with both sides, to prevent friction and limit incidents.”).
97 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425 (1978); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 426 
(1978).
98 See FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 10 (describing UNIFIL as having “long been engaged in civilian 
administration, humanitarian activities, and rebuilding infrastructure”).
99 See UNIFIL BACKGROUND, supra note 95.
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In terms of exercising its peacekeeping function, it can be argued that UNIFIL is 
hardly a success. Not only has it been unable to effectively mediate the land dispute
situation it was sent in to control, it cannot legitimately function in the area without the 
guaranteed protection (or at least guarantee of freedom from harassment) by such local 
groups as Hizbollah.100 From the start of the UNIFIL mission through the most recently 
released reports by the UNIFIL officers to the Secretary General and the Security Council 
there are recurrent trends which indicate the weakness of the UNIFIL mission.101 This 
weakness stems not only from the political and day-to-day situation in which UNIFIL 
operates, but also the failure of the U.N. itself to properly equip UNIFIL members and 
create a cohesive operating unit.102
If the purpose of a peacekeeping force and mission is, at its heart, to protect 
international peace and security through protecting the local populations involved in 
conflict and stopping the escalation of violence in the affected area, then UNIFIL 
represents a failure of peacekeeping. Rather than forcing an Israeli withdrawal from the 
area of southern Lebanon under UNIFIL’s control, UNIFIL sat by and was unable to do 
anything to stop the Israelis from further incursions into Lebanese sovereign territory in 
1982.103 Even after the Israeli pull-back from a portion of the southern Lebanese border 
100 See Krasno, supra note 11, at 241 (describing the transition from PLO control of the area around the 
Southern Lebanese border to Hizbollah control of the same area, under the noses of UNIFIL).
101 See, e.g., DENNIS C. JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS 26 (St. Martin’s Press: New York 2000) (stating 
that “[w]hen Israel’s incursion into Lebanon took place, UNIFIL was already on the scene but able to do 
little to prevent the fighting.”); FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 60 – 61 (describing the forced withdrawal of the 
French contingent to UNIFIL in 1986 when it became the target of attacks, as well as the brutal murder of a 
U.S. Marine (Lieutenant William R. Higgins) by terrorists while he was attached to a U.N. force operating 
in Southern Lebanon). 
102 See FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 74 (“Rapidly slapped together, UNIFIL suffered severe strategic, logistic, 
and procurement difficulties and lacked coherent organization.”).
103 See UNIFIL BACKGROUND, supra note 95.
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area in 2000,104 UNIFIL was still unable to stop the basic fighting between Israelis, 
Palestinians, and Lebanese, and, according to UNIFIL’s own documents, could do little 
more than act as a tattle-tale for observed bad acts on either side,105 while becoming a 
targets itself106 and finding itself unable to guarantee the safety of its personnel, 
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., id.; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN 
LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 17 JANUARY TO 17 JULY 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/537/14/PDF/N0053714.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (“Any violations of the withdrawal line are immediately brought to the attention of the side 
concerned.”) [hereinafter SG REPORT 2000].
106 See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR
THE PERIOD FROM 17 JULY 1997 TO 15 JANUARY 1998), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/009/91/IMG/N9800991.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (setting out the number of peacekeepers killed by hostilities in the course of UNIFIL at 76) 
[hereinafter SG REPORT 1997/1998]; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 16 JANUARY 1999 TO 15 JULY 1999), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/212/53/PDF/N9921253.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (detailing increased threats and attacks on UNIFIL personnel and stations, and UNIFIL’s 
asking for protection and cease-fire from armed forces operating in the area) [hereinafter SG REPORT 
1999]; INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN 
LEBANON (Oct. 31, 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/712/72/IMG/N0071272.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (“On several occasions, Hizbollah personnel have restricted the Force’s freedom of 
movement. . . . Hizbollah forced UNIFIL personnel at gunpoint to hand over vehicles and military 
hardware they found on the terrain.”); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 23 JANUARY  TO 20 JULY 2001), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/462/75/IMG/N0146275.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing repeated incursions by Israeli fighter jets into the affected area and Hizbollah 
actions to limit or stop UNIFIL mobility in its own area); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 24 JULY 2003 TO 19 JANUARY 2004), 
available at http://daccess.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/210/35/IMG/N0421035.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing increased incidents of civilian violence, including one in which the 
UNIFIL staff was caught in the crossfire, and stating that the most UNIFIL could do was “call for restraint” 
by the parties involved); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN 
LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 21 JANUARY TO 21 JULY 2004), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/427/61/IMG/N0442761.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing multiple incidents taking place on or near UNIFIL headquarters, and the death 
of another peacekeeper as the result of hostile fire – bringing the toll to 79); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 21 JANUARY 2004 TO 20
JULY 2005), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/210/76/PDF/N0521076.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing blatant targeting of UNIFIL and its personnel by all sides involved and 
UNIFIL’s impotence to stop these attacks and threats); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 21 JANUARY 2005 TO 20 JULY 2005), 
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/420/36/PDF/N0542036.pdf?OpenElement
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (stating that threats to UNIFIL positions and personnel have only increased, as 
illustrated by a time when the Lebanese Armed Forces had to be called in by UNIFIL to stop 
demonstrations taking place near its operating centers).
14
buildings, and equipment or the safety of the local populations.107 Indeed, perhaps the 
most involvement UNIFIL is alleged to have had in intervening in the Israeli-Lebanese 
conflict situation came in a 2000 incident in which UNIFIL forces were accused by the 
Israelis of secreting away videotape containing information on a group of Hizbollah 
members who kidnapped several Israeli soldiers.108
Despite these failures, the Lebanese government repeatedly asks for, and the U.N. 
Security Council repeatedly grants, extensions of the UNIFIL mission; the most recent 
extension provides for UNIFIL operations to continue through at least 2006.109
Interestingly, at a time when the Lebanese government and people are in the middle of a 
107 See SG REPORT 1997/1998, supra note 106 (describing the increase in violence between various forces 
in the affected area, which resulted in civilian casualties, using a statement which is standard in these 
reports, “the Force did its best to prevent its area of operations from being used for hostile activities”); 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE 
PERIOD 16 JANUARY TO 15 JULY 1998), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/197/12/IMG/N9819712.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Nov.
10, 2005) (stating that the incidents of violence among forces in the affected area “increased significantly” 
during the period, resulting in civilian casualties and injuries); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 16 JULY TO 15 JANUARY 1999), 
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/docs/UNDOC/GEN/N99/011/34/IMG/N9901134.pdf?OpenElement
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing the instances of hostilities occurring in the affected areas as “the 
highest number in a long time”); SG REPORT 1999, supra note 106 (“In the area of UNIFIL . . . the 
situation became more volatile. The armed elements became more assertive and showed an increasing 
tendency to operate in the vicinity of village and UNIFIL positions.”); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 16 JULY  1999 TO 15 
JANUARY 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/244/09/IMG/N0024409.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing attacks on civilians which occurred in the UNIFIL-controlled areas) [hereinafter 
SG REPORT 1999/2000]; SG REPORT 2000, supra note 105 (describing an assassination and other serious 
acts of violence committed in the UNIFIL area of control during the report period). REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 17 JANUARY
2002 TO 12 JULY 2002), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/474/30/IMG/N0247430.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (“Tensions in the UNIFIL area of operation increased during the reporting period, with an 
outbreak of violent incidents across the Blue Line in the first two weeks of April, surpassing any activity 
seen since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.”).
108 See UNIFIL BACKGROUND, supra note 95.
109 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1614 (2005). It is interesting to note that after 27 years in 
existence, this Resolution still refers to the “interim nature of UNIFIL” and “[l]ooks forward to the early 
fulfillment of the mandate of UNIFIL.” Id. Resolution 1614 is also of interest because it reaffirms the initial 
mandate for UNIFIL, while at the same time enlarging the scope of UNIFIL to include mine removal and 
other activities not designated in the UNIFIL mandate. Id. 
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debate over the future of the country’s ties with Hizbollah110 and Syria (a frequent source 
of Hizbollah funding111), UNIFIL’s extension means that the Lebanese government itself 
can put off a confrontation with Hizbollah in the southern Lebanon region where UNIFIL 
now operates. UNIFIL presence in this area can also be seen as retarding the concept of 
ownership over southern Lebanon by the Lebanese as a whole, as the area is not fully 
under the control of Lebanese military or police,112 and it can be argued that the 
continued presence of UNIFIL indicates to residents of the area, and by extension to the 
Lebanese in general that there is no settled incorporation of the area into sovereign 
Lebanese territory.
D. Analysis and conclusions
The above account of the UNIFIL mission paints a dismal picture for those 
peacekeepers and mission officials deployed to UNIFIL, as they face personal and 
professional threats, and  are essentially operating at the mercy of the armed factions and 
other groups operating in the border area.113 It also casts aspersions on whether UNIFIL 
110
 Not only is the validity of terrorism per se an issue all over the Middle East, Hizbollah in Lebanon is a 
particular issue because of the electoral role Hizbollah is seeking in the country. See “Lebanon Reborn?
Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005,” 
Panel I of a Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul. 28, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). It is important to note that a member of Hizbollah current holds a ministry 
portfolio, much to the displeasure of the international community. See id. (statement of C. David Welch, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs).
111 See generally Statement of C. David Welsh, supra note 110. 
112 UNIFIL BACKGROUND, supra note 95; see also REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (FOR THE PERIOD 15 JANUARY 2003 TO 23 JULY 2003), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/431/55/IMG/N0343155.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2005) (stating the Lebanese government’s oft-repeated opinion that until there is a complete 
ceasefire with Israel, Lebanese troops should not control the border area; this then allows Hizbollah a freer 
reign in the area without governmental prosecution).
113 See supra Part II. C.
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is operating on firm legal ground in light of the narrow language of its original mandate 
and the wide-ranging activities it currently engages in.114
Whatever the dismal nature of the UNIFIL mission for its staff members, it is 
even more dismal for the concept of nationalism and the nation-state in Lebanon, as well 
as the concept of ownership of the area by the Lebanese government and people. UNIFIL 
operated in the contested border area for all but the first three years of the Lebanese civil 
war, but was unable to do anything to stop the war or stop Israeli incursions into the civil 
war itself. UNIFIL was unable to stop the PLO from operating in the area, and when the 
PLO relocated, UNIFIL could not stop Hizbollah and other equally terroristic and 
disruptive groups from filling the void left by the PLO.115 Similarly, even after the end of 
the Lebanese civil war, UNIFIL has been unable to stop Israeli forces from intruding on 
the area. All of this leads to a status-quo situation, where no real progress towards 
integrating the border area into Lebanon, on a map or in the psyche, can be made. 
At the same time, the rest of Lebanon is at a precipice point for sovereignty and 
self-ownership of nation, as illustrated by the after-effects of the assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister - and increasingly vocal anti-Syrian advocate - Rafik Hariri on 
February 14, 2005, allegedly at the hands of Syrian-allied forces.116 In the days following 
Hariri’s death, the country came together and average Lebanese from a variety of 
114 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 425 (1978); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 426 
(1978); cf. UNIFIL BACKGROUND, supra note 95 (describing the overall scope of activities engaged in by 
UNIFIL and its duration since the 1978 resolutions).
115 See supra Part II. C. (detailing the rise of Hizbollah-based threats to civilians and UNIFIL personnel 
operating in the UNIFIL area in the years since the end of the Lebanese civil war).
116
 In response to the public outcry over Hariri’s assassination, the U.N. established a commission to 
investigate the murder. For information relating to the first report issued by the commission, and the 
commission’s ongoing activities, see LEBANON: WHO MURDERED HARIRI? INDEPENDENT PANEL PROBES 
EX-PREMIER’S ASSASSINATION, UN NEWS CENTRE, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=110&Body=Leban&Body1= (last visited Nov. 21, 
2005).
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religious sects began demanding a pullout of Syrian troops and intelligence agents in 
Lebanon.117 While this unity has not resulted in an overthrow of the standard confessional 
divides in Lebanese society, or changed any laws relating to societal status, it has 
demonstrated that the Lebanese Republic, as a constitutional government with viable 
rights and freedoms, is something with which many people associate themselves and feel 
a sense of responsibility and ownership for. 
UNIFIL becomes problematic in light of the Hariri episode because it perpetuates 
the idea of a fragmented Lebanon needing the protection of outside parties (however 
inadequate this protection might be) to survive. Legally, the framework for a viable 
Lebanon exists in the form of a constitution and series of statutory laws which were 
created by the Lebanese themselves and which, at least in the constitutional case, were 
able to withstand even civil war.118 The Hariri demonstrations and the Syrian retreat 
which followed are signals that the “nation” part of the “nation” and “state” duality 
discussed in Part I is becoming a more concrete reality in Lebanon, since the Lebanese 
were rallying for Syrian removal as Lebanese, not as Maronites, Sunnis, or any other 
confessional or self-identifying group.119 With the “state” apparatus entrenched in 
Lebanese law, politics, and society, and the “nation” idea constantly emerging, the 
UNIFIL presence can only serve to harm the creation of a viable Lebanese nation-state by 
undermining the sense of communality of all Lebanese territory under the same laws and 
117 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 49. 
118
 Certainly, one may question whether there was a disconnect between the constitutional provisions and 
society at the time of the civil war, however it deserves emphasizing that the constitution emerged virtually 
unscathed from the civil war and the Ta’if Accord that ended it. In this sense, adherence to the Lebanese
constitution is a reaffirmation of Lebanese national identity and ownership of the state because the 
constitution was not created by the U.N. or other entities in the wake of the civil war – contrast this with the 
constitutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo discussed below. The national ownership 
of the Lebanese constitution is most closely analogous to the current draft Iraqi constitution than either the 
Congo or Kosovo constitutions.
119 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 49.
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by the same people. UNIFIL also provides a staging ground for Hizbollah and other 
terror groups to infiltrate Lebanon further, thereby continuing to threaten the cohesion of 
the Lebanese state and identity. There may indeed be some problems with the state, and 
the cohesion of national identity might need to be strengthened, but the ultimate purpose 
of self-determination has been met in Lebanon, and international peace and security can 
only be undermined by maintaining a divisive U.N. peacekeeping force and mission 
there.
Part III – the Democratic Republic of Congo
A. Missions Past - UNONUC
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Congo), formerly known as the 
Belgian Congo,120 has the distinction of being the site of the U.N. peacekeeping operation 
which launched the peacekeeping mechanism that has evolved into the current U.N. 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.121 From the outset, the conflict in the Congo 
was both international – in that other nations, particularly  Belgium, were directly 
involved in the conflict122 – and an intranational civil war, in which various factions 
started a civil war within days of the country’s 1960 grant of independence.123 In this 
sense, the first U.N. peacekeeping deployment in the Congo (named United Nations 
120 See RAM CHANDRA PRADHAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGO CRISIS 3 – 5 (MANAS 
Publications: New Delhi, India 1975).
121 See also Charles Norchi, Human Rights: A Global Common Interest in THE UNITED NATIONS:
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY 100 (Jean E. Krasno ed.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2004).
122 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 145 (1960); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 146
(1960) (urging withdrawal of Belgian troops in the Congo for the stability of the country); BACKGROUND, 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO – ONUC, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
BACKGROUND ONUC].
123 See generally GEORGES ABI-SAAB, THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO 1960 – 1964 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978) (providing details of the parties involved in the Congo conflict 
before and after UNONUC’s deployment); BACKGROUND ONUC, supra note 122.
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Operation in the Congo, or UNONUC124) was a test not only for the Congo as a nation 
and the peacekeepers sent to protect it, but also to the idea of self-determination which 
forms the backbone of the U.N. itself and the U. N. Charter.125 Due to the international 
aspects of the conflict, intervention in the Congo was also viewed as an extension of the 
preservation of “international peace and security” called for in the U.N. Charter.126
UNONUC forces were assisted in their efforts by the diplomatic efforts of the then-
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld himself127; indeed Hammarskjöld’s death was 
caused by an aircraft accident which occurred while he was in the area to assist with the 
peace process.128
The 1960 conflict in the Congo was in essence a conflict for the fledgling nation-
state and its ownership. The initial throes of the Congolese independence movement 
featured economic hardship and societal differences which emerged in the face of 
independence.129 In the years leading up to full-fledged Congolese independence, the idea 
of independence and the type of state which the Congo would be in the future emerged in 
a variety of political parties, each represented by its own leaders and with its own 
124 REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT 
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS – COMPLETED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
125
 The Congo had been colonized by the Belgians in the 1880s, becoming an official colony in 1908. See 
PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 3 – 5; Rosalyn Higgins, Introduction, Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 1960 
– 1964, in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946 – 1967 DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY III AFRICA 7 
(Rosalyn Higgins ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980) [hereinafter Higgins, ONUC].
126 PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 44 – 46 (setting forth the parameters of the UNONUC mission as opposed 
to other peacekeeping missions at the time, and noting that the only time force was authorized for 
UNONUC was when a peacekeeper was acting in self-defense).
127
 It was Hammarskjöld who first defined the role peacekeepers were to play by refusing requests by the 
Congolese government to place the U.N. peacekeepers in the hands of the government itself. PRADHAN, 
supra note 120, at 61.  For an excellent source of insights into the private actions and motivations of Dag 
Hammarskjöld during the emergence of the Congo conflict, see ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 1 – 20. 
128 PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 145; ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 154.
129 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 16 – 18; ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 6 – 9; JAMES DOBBINS, SETH G. 
JONES, KEITH CRANE, ANDREW RATHMELL, BRETT STEELE & RICHARD TELTSCHIK, THE UN’S ROLE IN 
NATION-BUILDING: FROM THE CONGO TO IRAQ 5 – 6 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2004).
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concepts of what the new nation should be.130 Despite the well-intentioned rhetoric of 
self-determination, in the early Congolese case independence and free elections bred 
violence and provincial fighting which ignited into the civil war and occasioned the 
arrival of U.N. peacekeeping forces131 on the heels of an attempt by Belgium to re-deploy 
its troops to the area.132
As the Congolese civil war progressed it began to involve the U.N. in general, and 
the UNONUC forces in particular, in its power contest,133 until finally the Security 
Council refined UNONUC’s mandate in the Congo to reflect the reality of the political 
and legal situation on the ground rather than in a conference room.134 Even then, the 
diplomatic and day-to-day ground conditions in the Congo were extremely volatile and 
unpredictable for diplomats, officials, and peacekeepers alike.135 Indeed, after four years 
130 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 18 – 23 (describing the rise of political parties, their differences, and 
their nascent leaders); ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 6 – 9 (describing the early attempts of various 
Congolese leaders to draw the U.N. and Security Council members into the conflict); Higgins, ONUC, 
supra note 125, at 10 – 13; Krasno, supra note 11, at 233.
131 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 24 – 34 (describing the political unrest attendant on the 1960 national 
elections, and in particular the discontent within the army which ultimately led to the Congolese civil war); 
ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, 21 – 53 (setting out the actors involved and the reasons for UNONUC’s first 
presence in the Congo); see generally ABI-SAAB, supra note 123 (describing the motivations of the 
Congolese actors and the stages of their internal fight for control and external fight for international 
recognition and support throughout the Congo conflict).
132 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 35; ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 21 – 28; Higgins, ONUC, supra note 
125, at 11 – 13. 
133
 For a complete account of the history and background of the civil war’s escalation, see PRADHAN, supra
note 120, at 70 – 117 (providing detailed descriptions of the factions in the Congo, their lobbying 
techniques within the U.N. structure, and the response of various members of the U.N. to each side); 
Chandra Lekha Sriram & Karin Wermester, From Risk to Response: Phases of Conflict, Phases of Conflict 
Prevention 42 in FROM PROMISE TO PRACTICE: STRENGTHENING UN CAPACITIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
VIOLENT CONFLICT (Chandra Lekha & Karin Wermester eds.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
2003).
134 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 127 (“the . . . resolution laid down three primary objectives for the UN 
to pursue in the Congo: (a) the prevention of civil war (b) the withdrawal of the Belgian and other foreign 
military and para-military personnel and political advisers from the Congo (c) the creation of a right 
atmosphere of the Congolese Parliament.”); ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 97 – 106.
135 See generally PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 118 – 198 (setting out the details and strategies involved on 
all sides of the conflict in the various provinces affected, and the U.N. reaction to them).
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in the Congo UNONUC officials and peacekeepers were still faced with fresh outbreaks 
of fighting and violence in new areas of the country.136
One of the reasons for the continued conflict in the Congo was the abrogation of 
the Congolese constitution,137 which initially occurred in 1960, and continued to be an 
issue throughout the course of the conflict.138 Although the conflict in the Congo was 
ultimately calmed under the Mobutu regime,139 and UNONUC forces left the Congo by 
the end of 1964,140 the first Congolese civil war conflict rent a hole in the fabric of 
constitutionalism in the new nation.141 Tellingly, the UNONUC mission had also created 
tension at the U.N. as to the constitutionality of peacekeeping activities such as 
UNONUC under the terms of the U.N. Charter142; these tensions would later be resolved 
in favor of increased U. N. peacekeeping activity.143
B. Post – UNONUC Background
While the Mobutu regime in the Congo arguably did not bring societal openness 
or an environment conducive to the enjoyment of constitutional rights and freedoms,144 it 
did bring a semblance of stability to the country until the mid-1990s.145 However, the 
136 See PRADHAN, supra note 120, at 206 – 208; ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 192. For a description of the 
political and military situation in UNONUC, see Higgins, ONUC, supra note 125, at 61 – 83. 
137 ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 54; Higgins, ONUC, supra note 125, at 9 – 10 (providing a description of 
the first Congolese constitution).
138 See ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 54 – 123. 
139 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 129, at 14; BACKGROUND NOTE: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
(KINSHASA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm (last 
visited Nov. 9. 2005) (detailing Mobutu’s regime) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO].
140 See ABI-SAAB, supra note 123, at 192.
141 See DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 129, at 14 (“ONUC failed to eliminate, and in some respects contributed 
to, the constitutional weaknesses of the Congolese government.”).
142
 Higgins, ONUC, supra note 125, at 54 – 60.
143 See Krasno, supra note 11, at 238 – 260 (describing the changing role of U.N. peacekeeping operations 
from the completion of UNONUC to 2004).
144 See BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139 (providing information on the constitution 
promulgated after the Mobutu regime came into power and throughout its tenure). 
145 See id. (describing the political and social climate under the Mobutu regime); THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
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political climate in neighboring states was not as tightly controlled as Mobutu’s Congo, 
and by the mid-1990s ethnic fighting in Rwanda had started to spill over into the Congo, 
at least in terms of sending combatants across the border.146 The internal state of law and 
order in the Congo began to deteriorate at the same time,147 and in 1999 Mobutu was 
removed from power in a coup; he was then succeeded by Laurent Kabila.148
C. UNMONUC – mandate and mission
In the wake of the Kabila coup and the rising instability in the Congo, the U.N. 
Security Council created the UNMONUC force for the Congo,149 initially as an observer 
mission only.150 However, the situation in the Congo did not stabilize, and by 2001 the 
U.N. Security Council authorized an increase in UNMONUC military personnel.151
Unlike the UNONUC forces, which were deployed to try to keep the peace in a 
nascent country, the UNMONUC forces were sent in to stabilize the region, yet to date 
have failed to do so. UNMONUC forces have not stopped the Congolese fighting after 
six years of deployment, and indeed stories of atrocities against the Congolese peoples 
and other refugee populations which UNMONUC are charged with protecting emerge 
from the area on a regular basis.152 UNMONUC forces themselves are also targets of 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/cg.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter CONGO 
FACTBOOK].
146 See CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145.
147 FLEITZ, supra note 45, at 169.
148 Id. 
149 Id. (describing the UNMONUC mandate as “buffer, observer, and humanitarian to restore order in the 
Congo, which is divided by a war between Congolese factions and troops from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
and Angola. Given ‘Chapter VII mandate’ to defend civilians, UN personnel, and UN facilities.”).
150 Id. 
151 Id.
152 See UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS YEAR IN REVIEW 2004, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review04/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2005) (describing several instances where prominent areas and targets in the Congo were 
seized, and civilians harmed, and UNMONUC’s inability to stop such events from happening); OPERATION 
ARTEMIS: THE LESSONS OF THE INTERIM EMERGENCY MULTINATIONAL FORCE, PEACEKEEPING BEST 
PRACTICES UNIT, MILITARY DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 
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various warring factions, in a similar fashion to UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, and 
UNMONUC peacekeepers have been targeted, killed, and injured by these factions since 
their arrival in the Congo.153
In light of the humanitarian charge given to UNMONUC under its mandate, an 
account of UNMONUC activities is not complete without a mention of the hideous and 
frequent allegations, largely substantiated, of sexual abuse by UNMONUC forces against 
the very women and children they are in the Congo to protect.154 The U.N. response to 
this – greater peacekeeper education about safe sex with host populations and a further 
study of the allegations – seems not only grossly out-of-proportion to the gravity of the 
situation,155 but also belies the essential question at the heart of these abuses – whether 
peace and security are being advanced by allowing UNMONUC forces to rape, spread 
HIV and other diseases, and father children without impunity.156
Turning to law and politics in the Congo, UNMONUC has similarly been unable 
to keep the peace or foster a settlement to the hostilities. There is a functioning 
government of the Congo,157 which is an extension of the Kabila regime under the 
leadership of Laurent Kabila’s son,158 Joseph, who assumed control after his father’s 
available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Artemis.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (reporting on 
Operation Artemis, which was deployed in 2003 to assist U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo who had become 
overwhelmed by the situation on the ground).
153 See FATALITIES, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO – MONUC – FACTS AND FIGURES, UNITED 
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
154 See Alexandra R. Harrington, Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against U.N. Peacekeepers 
and the Role of Law in Preventing them in the Future, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2005).
155
 For an account of the many forms of abuses perpetrated by U.N. forces in the Congo in particular, and 
the impact which these acts have on their victims, the victims’ families, and the region as a while, see id.
156 See id.
157 CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
158 CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
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death.159 Early attempts at cease-fires and draft settlements which were brokered by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the U.N. failed miserably.160 At present, there
is a draft Congolese constitution which is scheduled to be sent to the voters for 
referendum approval at some point in 2006161; this, and the election of several vice-
presidents and ministers to a temporary government of an unspecified duration,162 are the 
only concrete and seemingly long-lasting steps towards legal and political stability which
have been achieved during the time of UNMONUC’s mission in the Congo.
D. Analysis
Unlike the UNIFIL mission, which has jurisdiction limited to a particular area 
within an already established state, UNMONUC operates in what is best described as the 
remnants of a state. The Mobutu regime held the shattered state which emerged from the 
first Congolese civil war together through standard dictatorial practices of highly 
concentrated control and by ignoring constitutional imperatives163; it did not foster legal 
or political avenues for citizens to take ownership of the state. The regime repressed
political movements which ran counter to its own stances, positions and views,164 but it 
could not control the inner workings of neighboring countries, and was similarly unable 
159 CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
160 See Letter Dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (transmitting the text of an attempted 
Ceasefire in the Congo, which was endorsed by the OAU and contained provisions for a significant role for 
the OAU were the ceasefire to have held).
161 CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139. For the text of the 
draft Congolese constitution, see PROJET DE CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL INFORMATION NETWORK, available at
http://www.glin.gov/view.do?documentID=160383&showAll=time (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) 
[hereinafter DRAFT CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION].
162 CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
163 See CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
164 See CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
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to stop the flow of unrest from these neighbors across the borders of the Congo.165 By the 
time UNMONUC was authorized and deployed a very legitimate question existed (and 
still exists) – whether there was actually any peace to keep.
Once deployed to the Congo, UNMONUC was similarly unable to bring an end to 
the conflicts raging inside the country. UNMONUC’s mission mandate calls for 
peacekeepers to do several things while in the Congo,166 but the use of force is not one of 
them except in a few rare instances167; hence, UNMONUC forces have become targets in 
the conflict.168 Due to their weak status vis a vis the use of force, UNMONUC forces 
have also been unable to protect the population of the Congo from warring factions. 
Indeed, UNMONUC has been unable to protect these populations even from themselves.
Legally, the UNMONUC mission has proved no more successful. With 
UNMONUC forces unable to control the fighting, early attempts at peace and cease-fire 
were scuttled.169 Currently, a draft constitution exists and, if enacted, this draft 
constitution purports to guarantee Congolese citizens many rights and privileges.170
However, this draft constitution contains several provisions which are problematic and 
165 See CONGO FACTBOOK, supra note 145; BACKGROUND NOTE CONGO, supra note 139.
166 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1291 (2000); see also DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO –
MONUC – MANDATE, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
MONUC MANDATE]. 
167 See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1565 (2004); MONUC MANDATE, supra note 166.
168 See FATALITIES, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO – MONUC – FACTS AND FIGURES, UNITED 
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (providing current 
casualty figures for the UNMONUC mission).
169 See Letter Dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
170 See DRAFT CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161 
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call into question whether the state to be governed by this constitution actually exists or is 
a constructed fiction.171
The explanatory note to the draft constitution explains that “[s]ince its 
independence. . . the Democratic Republic of Congo has been confronted by recurrent 
political crises, one of the fundamental causes of which has been the contestation of its 
institutions and actors.”172 The preamble to the draft constitution states “We, the 
Congolese people, united by destiny and a history of noble ideas of liberty, fraternity, 
solidarity, justice, peace, and work. . . . Reaffirm our inalienable and unprescribable right 
for us to organize freely and develop our political, economic, social and cultural lives.”173
The first title of the explanatory note of the draft constitution, “The State and Its 
Sovereignty,”174 provides that “the present constitution reaffirms democratic principles 
which emanate from the people as the source of primary sovereignty.”175 However, 
Article 51 of the constitution provides “[t]he State has the task of assuring and promoting 
the peaceful and harmonious coexistence of all ethnic groups in the country. The State 
assures equal protection and promotion of vulnerable groups and all minorities in the 
State.”176 Further, Article 66 charges the Congolese people themselves with the task of 
stopping discrimination.177
On their face, these constitutional provisions are lofty goals and pleasant sound
bites. However, a look at what these provisions mean when taken together paints a far 
less pleasing picture. Admitting that there have been difficulties with sovereignty and 
171 See id. 
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See DRAFT CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at art. 51.
177 Id. at art. 66.
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peace in the Congo is certainly a historical truism, however this admission also 
undermines the idea that the draft constitution has been created for a viable state which 
can go forward and govern itself peaceably. Admitting difficulties with sovereignty and 
peace since Congolese independence while at the same time constructing a questionable 
basis of beliefs which all Congolese as a people are assumed to  hold and are entitled to is 
both incongruous and leads to an unbalanced legal construct and societal sense of the 
guiding history of the Congo. By charging the state with monitoring and overseeing the 
equal protection of minorities and other groups which have been victims of 
discrimination or worse in the past, the draft constitution legalizes the concept that the 
Congolese people as a whole are still divided and cannot function as a society without the 
intervention of the government to stop fighting. Conversely, by charging the people with 
the legal duty of stopping discrimination, the draft constitution also enshrines the idea 
that the federal government created in the draft constitution must have help in protecting 
its citizens and is not legally powerful or societally respected  enough to control its 
population.
Certainly the UNMONUC forces did not write the draft constitution provisions 
and are not responsible for these glaring problems which will likely prevent the full 
realization of a viable Congolese nation-state owned by all Congolese if the draft 
constitution is ultimately adopted. However, UNMONUC is responsible for the draft 
constitution because by its very presence and premise, UNMONUC insinuates that there 
is a single Congolese state to preserve and keep peaceful. Self-determination as a concept 
was meant to free people from colonization, however there is no legal or practical basis to 
support the idea that self-determination as an espoused right stopped when European 
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nations left. If the U.N.’s true goal is to provide the people of the world with the right to 
self-determination, and the ability to access this right, then it must also realize that self-
determination can come in the form of neighbors electing to fight and secede from their 
neighbors even if the state being deconstructed by such secession was a U.N.-based 
construct in the past. Years of peacekeeping operations have amply illustrated that, when 
there is no peace to keep, peacekeeping becomes futile and impedes progress towards an 
ultimate solution to the conflict.
The case of UNMONUC and the current attempts at governing the Congo also 
indicate that peacekeeping missions can undermine international peace and security. 
Peacekeepers becoming victims of the conflict cannot protect domestic or international 
peace and security, and peacekeepers who become predators do nothing but harm to the 
concept of international peace and security. Turning to law, peacekeepers, and their 
missions, deployed to areas fraught with ethnic and affiliational conflicts -  which are so 
deep-seated that they have existed at least since independence and are subject to 
constitutional attempts to keep in check – undermine the laws of the U.N. Charter which 
they are charged with upholding and leave open the possibility that international peace 
and security will be continually undermined in the aftermath of the installation of a new 
governmental apparatus which seeks to put a legal gloss over decades of conflict without 
solving the underlying reasons behind it.
Part IV – Kosovo
A. History and Background
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Currently, Kosovo is part of the internationally recognized territory of Serbia and 
Montenegro.178 Formerly part of Yugoslavia, Kosovo began to experience internal 
conflicts at the end of the 1990s,179 when the states comprising Yugoslavia were in the 
process of dividing up the doomed Yugoslav state into smaller nations.180 During this 
process, the Serbs engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the 
largely-Albanian population in the Kosovo province of Serbia.181 In the face of these acts, 
and on the heels of the very public atrocities committed upon various ethnic groups in 
neighboring Bosnia,182 the international community began to react to the Kosovo 
violence, first through NATO and then through the U.N.183
The political situation in Serbia and Montenegro stabilized after the 2000 regime 
change which saw the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic,184 and currently is under the legal 
safeguards of a valid and binding constitution.185 This constitution proclaims itself as the 
constitution of all Serbia and Montenegro and contemplates that the Kosovo province is 
178 See SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/yi.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter SERBIA 
& MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK]; BACKGROUND NOTE: SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) 
[hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO].
179 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178; BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, 
supra note 178.
180 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178; BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, 
supra note 178.
181 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178; BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, 
supra note 178.
182 See Satish Namibar, UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia – from UNPROFOR to 
Kosovo in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT ENGAGEMENT
177 – 179 (Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel eds.) (New York: United Nations University Press 
2001); see generally SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178; BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & 
MONTENEGRO, supra note 178.
183 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178; BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, 
supra note 178; see also Dick A. Leurdijk, The UN and NATO: The Logic of Primacy in THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY: EUROPE AND BEYOND 64 – 68 (Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal 
Singh Sidhu eds.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) (outlining the initial relationship between 
U.N. and N.A.T.O. forces in Kosovo).
184 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178. 
185 See CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE OF UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, available at
http://www.gov.yu/document/povelja.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
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still part of the sovereign territory of Serbia and Montenegro , albeit under the protection 
of outside actors.186
The constitution of Serbia and Montenegro creates a uniform seal and flag for the 
country, uniting all groups under this banner.187 This constitution guarantees citizens of 
each constituent state/province the same rights and privileges as those in other constituent 
states/provinces enjoy.188 The constitution also attempts to create equality and parity 
between member states at the ministerial level by requiring that certain key ministries be 
split between members from different states.189 Under the judiciary provisions of the 
constitution, all judicial hearings on constitutional questions having to do with the 
interpretation of the federal constitution must also be attended by state justices who are to 
have input on the constitutional question at hand.190 A state in Serbia and Montenegro 
retains the right to secede from the federal constitution through certain referenda 
mechanisms.191 Additionally, the constitution of Serbia and Montenegro has an 
amendment, the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties which 
guarantees rights and freedoms to all ethnicities, religions, and member state 
populations.192 Among the many provisions of this Charter is an article specifically 
186 See id., PREAMBLE (“Proceeding from the equality of the two member state, the state of Montenegro ad 
the state of Serbia which includes the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo and Metohija, the latter currently under international administration in accordance with UN SC 
resolution 1244.”). 
187 Id. at art 4.
188 Id. at art. 7 (“A citizen of a member state shall also be a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro. A citizen of a 
member state shall have equal rights and duties in the other member state as its own citizen, except for the 
right to vote and be elected.”).
189 Id. at art. 35.
190 Id. at art. 49.
191 CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE OF UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, ART. 60,  available 
at http://www.gov.yu/document/povelja.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
192 See CHARTER ON HUMAN AND MINORITY RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, available at
http://www.gov.yu/document/povelja.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
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enumerating special rights of minority groups,193 and an article which exhorts member 
states to enact legislation and social programs geared towards raising the standard of 
living of minority groups in the state.194
B. UNMIK
The United Nations authorized a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Mission 
in Kosovo or UNMIK) for Kosovo in 1999.195 UNMIK was on the ground in Kosovo 
soon after its mandate, sharing some of its responsibilities with NATO forces which were 
already in the area.196
Under the terms of its mandate, UNMIK was not only supposed to stop the ethnic 
and other violence occurring in Kosovo, it was also to “perform basic civilian 
administration functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status; 
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the 
reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; 
193 Id. at art. 52 (“Members of national minorities shall have the following rights: to express, keep, cherish, 
develop and publicly manifest their national and ethnic, cultural and religious identity; to use their symbols 
in public places; to freely use their language and script; to proceedings being conducted by the authorities 
in the communities having a considerable minority population also in the language of the minority 
population concerned; to receive education in their language in state institutions; to establish private 
educational institutions at all levels; to use their own name and surname in their own language; to the
traditional local names, names of streets and settlements, as well as topographic signs to be written also in 
the minority language; to a certain number of seats in the Assembly of the Member State concerned and in 
the Assembly of the State Union, based on the principle of direct representation, in accordance with the 
laws of the Member States; to be adequately represented in public services, state authorities and local self-
governance authorities; to be fully and impartially informed in their own language, including the right to 
express, receive, send, and exchange information and ideas; to establish their own public media.”).
194 Id. at art. 55. It should also be noted that recent editions of the U.S. Sate Department’s annual report on 
religious freedom emphasizes that those acts of religious-based criminality or discrimination in Serbia and 
Montenegro were not done at the behest of state actors. See SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO (INCLUDES 
KOSOVO), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51578.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
195 See UNMIK AT A GLANCE, UNMIK, UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO, 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (providing a description on 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the mandate resolution for UNMIK) [hereinafter UNMIK AT A
GLANCE].
196 See id. 
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and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes in Kosovo.”197 Regardless of whether one views this mandate as within or without 
the scope of the U.N. Charter,198 these goals were easier promulgated than achieved.
In the six years since the creation and deployment of UNMIK, the mission has not 
met its goals. Administration of justice is in and of itself a struggle over which ethnic 
group’s law to apply and how to apply it.199 There are increasing reports of civilian-on-
civilian violence based on ethnic differences despite the presence of UNMIK forces.200
And, most importantly, governmental creation is at a standstill.201
The closest UNMIK has come to sponsoring an independent government for 
Kosovo is the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government,202 which 
has not been officially adopted,203 and does not enjoy U.S. support.204 Under the terms of 
the Constitutional Framework, much of the governing of Kosovo would be done by 
197 See id. (stating the scope of UNMIK’s jurisdiction under Resolution 1244).
198
 The author emphasizes her belief that strictly reading the U.N Charter, which is the only “law” of the 
U.N. that has any staying power and does not expire – except for treaties which themselves stem from the 
Charter – is the only legal way to read the Charter. Accordingly, it is her belief that missions such as 
UNMIK, which conflate peacekeeping with glorified nation-building, are not legal when justified by the 
U.N. Charter alone.
199 See Anthony J. Miller, Keynote Address: UNMIK: Lessons from the Early Institution-Building Phase, 
39 NEW ENGLAND L. R. 1, 16 (2004) (discussing the disjointed effort by UNMIK associated foreign 
lawyers to use international law in Kosovo when local populations were seeking to have their cultural and 
traditional laws applied instead); Peter Viggo Jackson, Military Forces and Public Security Challenges in 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY: EUROPE AND BEYOND 142 – 143  (Michael Pugh and 
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu eds.) (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) (describing the 
incongruities of applicable laws in Kosovo when foreign jurists and lawyers were brought into the region to 
act as neutral sources of law and justice); David Marshall, Reviving the Judicial and Penal System in 
Kosovo in THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY: EUROPE AND BEYOND 155 – 174  (Michael 
Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu eds.) (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003).
200
 For recent accounts of violence, see KIM INFO NEWSLETTER 10- 11-05, available at
http://www.kosovo.com/news/archive/2005/Novermber _11/1.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (providing 
an assortment of news stories on the peacemaking efforts in Kosovo and resurgent violence in the area).
201
 The Constitutional Framework was promulgated in May, 2001, but has yet to be acted upon. See
CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE OF UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, ART. 60, available at
http://www.gov.yu/document/povelja.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See Briefing on U.S. Strategy for Kosovo, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Nov. 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/56651.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
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UNMIK and its leadership directly and for an indefinite period of time.205 The 
Constitutional Framework subdivides the residents of Kosovo into ethnic and/or religious 
groups and subgroups, and purporting to give each of these groups their own set of 
guaranteed rights and freedoms.206 This division is carried through to elections, which, 
under the Constitutional Framework, would be administered by apportioning  the allotted 
Parliamentary seats by groups in order to make sure that ethnic and religious segments of 
the population are present in the parliamentary government.207
C. Analysis
UNMIK’s mandate is arguably not a peacekeeping mandate at all, but rather a 
state-building mandate208; in this sense, it undermines the legal and ethical premise of 
self-determination, and, in so doing, undermines the basic U.N. tenet of international 
peace and security. 
Legally, there is no basis for the independence of Kosovo outside of the U.N. 
expressing its view that, in the face of ethnic cleansing carried out against Kosovars by 
some Serbians, Kosovo should be its own state.209 Before the creation of Yugoslavia after 
World War I, the Kosovo area was part of other empires and not its own sovereign 
entity.210 Indeed, Milosevic’s reign of terror against Kosovars was not motivated by an 
205 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, CHAP. 8,  UNMIK/REG/2001/9 
– 15 MAY 2001, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2005).
206 Id. at chap. 4.4 (providing additional rights to those in the constitution of Serbia and Montenegro, and 
creating an environment in which the rights of each community come to define the community and its 
relations with society at large).
207 Id. at chap. 9. Contrast this endorsed plan with the situation in Lebanon, where confessionalism is 
enshrined in law and politics and yet often decried by the general international public.
208 See UNMIK AT A GLANCE, supra note 195.
209 See SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178.
210 BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, supra note 178.
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attempt to stop Kosovar independence211; rather, it was an attempt to cleanse Serbia of 
groups other than Serbs.212 It was only in reaction to this cleansing attempt that Kosovar 
independence groups began to emerge.213
Of the three case studies presented in this article, Kosovo offers the most puzzling 
example of U.N. peacekeeping presence as a catalyst to create a nation where there 
otherwise might not be one. Examining the Constitutional Framework, the lack of a 
unified people to make up a “nation” and the lack of any semblance of a legal or 
governmental apparatus to make up a “state” is glaringly obvious. The Constitutional 
Framework acknowledges that there is no homogenous Kosovar population,214 and 
fosters the already existing divides among those living in Kosovo by allowing any and 
every group present in the Kosovo province to avail itself of rights which are designed to 
create differences rather than celebrate the diverse beliefs found in a unified society, or 
create a unified society at all. If neighbors are guaranteed the right to celebrate their 
differences in the constitution but are not also bound under the same description as 
“Kosovars” (or any other nationality), there is no shared sense of Kosovar identity which 
can support the imposition of laws and governmental apparatuses on individuals. Rather, 
neighbors will view each other by their subgroups, and depend on their ethnic or religious 
leaders for legitimatization of law and government, thus depriving citizens of owning 
their nation.
The role of UNMIK under the Constitutional Framework is a complete abrogation 
of any form of self-government by the Kosovars. The concept of self-determination is 
211 See id.
212 See id.; see also SERBIA & MONTENEGRO FACTBOOK, supra note 178.
213 BACKGROUND NOTE SERBIA & MONTENEGRO, supra note 178.
214 UNMIK AT A GLANCE, supra note 195.
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just that – the determination of a people to live together as a nation with shared laws, 
values, and government.215 Self-determination does not include any role, no matter how 
short-lived, for a non-military occupying force to act as the source of legal and 
governmental primacy in the affected area. By creating a legally binding government 
apparatus which usurps local control, UNMIK and its officers have drafted a document 
which takes the “state” concept away from Kosovars for an indeterminate period of time 
and inserts itself and other U.N. bodies as quasi-governmental organizations.216 There are 
no checks on the powers used by these quasi-governmental bodies, the Kosovars are not 
given the right to request that these bodies leave or cease their activities, and the most 
that the people of Kosovo are guaranteed is that there will be some nascent form of 
Parliament created, although even this body is accountable to UNMIK’s leadership.217
Certainly, nothing can erase the horrors of Serbian acts of violence against 
Kosovars; however, examining the UNMIK construct of a state for Kosovo, one wonders 
whether more injustice will be done to Kosovars if they stay part of Serbia and 
Montenegro or if they succumb to the Constitutional Framework proposed by UNMIK.
With constitutional guarantees of civil rights and freedoms forming the backbone of the 
new constitution of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovars, should they opt to remain part of 
Serbia and Montenegro, would at least have the opportunity to have their voices heard in 
a national setting and be citizens of a larger state which protects their rights and is 
accountable to the people who comprise it. Even if Kosovo as a province were ultimately 
215 See U.N. CHARTER chap. XI.
216 See generally, UNMIK AT TWO, UNMIK UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN 
KOSOVO, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/2ndyear/unmikat2.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) 
(describing the involvement of other U.N. organizations in UNMIK). 
217 See generally CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,  
UNMIK/REG/2001/9 – 15 MAY 2001, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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to secede from Serbia and Montenegro, as it could do under the constitutional provisions 
existing in Serbia and Montenegro, it would be seceding as a state to presumably form its 
own state. This would be vastly preferable to surrendering its freedoms to a 
Constitutional Framework created and administered by UNMIK actors who are 
unaccountable to the Kosovars and who cannot create either the “nation” or the “state” in 
Kosovo.
Part V – Conclusion
Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kosovo are states separated 
by distance on maps, time, language, religion, ethnicity, and modernity, to mention only a 
few areas. These countries do not share common ancestry, or heritage, or culture. And 
yet, they all have a common bond, one that goes beyond the U.N. peacekeepers who have 
set foot on their soil – they are all entitled to self-determination under the laws and ethical 
mores of the U.N. This entitlement did not cease to exist when colonial governments 
were broken up, and it is no way limited to self-determination from European or Western 
powers only.
The states selected as case studies for this article were chosen because they 
represent different points on the road toward the creation of a nation-state that gives its 
citizens legal and cultural ownership of the state such that they become part of the state’s 
nationalism construct. These states are also illustrations of the unique ability of U.N. 
peacekeeping missions to hinder the creation of a viable nation-state.
The Lebanese experience with UNIFIL demonstrates that, good intentions and 
requests of some parties involved aside, there comes a time when the presence of U.N. 
peacekeepers who cannot even stop violence in the area to which they are deployed
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serves only to preserve domestic strife and cleavages, thus creating a disconnect between 
existing laws and norms which would allow full integration if left alone.
The Congolese experience with UNONUC and UNMONUC questions whether 
U.N. peacekeeping missions do legitimately preserve nation-states, and concludes that, 
contrary to mandates and mission statements, U.N. peacekeepers and their missions can 
easily become agents of cohesion for a nation-state so lacking in cohesion that it is 
neither a “nation” nor a “state.”
The Kosovo experience with UNMIK is designed to illustrate the dangers that 
U.N. peacekeeping exhibits when it crosses the bounds of any form of peacekeeping that 
could have been envisioned at the time the U.N. Charter was enacted, or the first 
peacekeeping missions created, to become itself an agent of colonization under the guise 
of humanitarian benevolence and acquired knowledge. 
Taken individually, these case studies offer lessons and insights into the nature of 
nation-states, nationalism, and the role of an outside peacekeeping force in both. As a 
whole, this article demonstrates that, regardless of the justification for intervention, U.N. 
peacekeeping operations devolve into exercises which threaten the ability of people in an 
affected area to exercise their U.N.-given legal and moral rights to self- determination. 
This article also demonstrates that when peacekeepers tarry too long in an area or attempt 
to keep a state lacking the “nation” and the “state” duality required for a viable nation-
state together they can work to upset international peace and security – in the present, as 
in Lebanon, or in the future, as with UNONUC in the Congo, which voids the legal basis 
for the creation of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the U.N. Conflict and 
violence are not palatable concepts in a society driven largely by humanitarian ideals and 
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constructs; however, forcing groups of people to live together unwillingly because 
diplomats and peacekeepers can salvage a constructed state, or because an international 
body deems itself a proper source of law and government for these peoples, is as violative 
of the humanitarian right of self-determination to create a nation-state and a sense of 
nationalism as is arming the combatant groups or allowing them to go their separate 
ways.
